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When Wade Henderson, director of the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, rented a car to drive to the University of Richmond Law
School to give a lecture, he chose a bland family car rather than a flashy
sports model.' Journalist and academic Salim Muwakkil not only rents
drab, nondescript cars when he travels on the highway, but he also
leaves his favorite black beret at home.' Neither man has a passion for
dull-looking cars, and both can probably afford the fancier models.
However, they make these decisions because they know from experience
that the flashy sports car or the jaunty beret would increase their chances
of being stopped by the police.
Wade Henderson and Salim Muwakkil are African American men.
That fact makes them more likely to be stopped and detained by the
police than their white counterparts.' Flashy cars and distinctive hats
attract the attention of the police even more. Neither the advancing age
nor the graying hair of these men offset the problem-a presumptive
social offense which Mr. Muwakkil cogently describes as "Driving
While Black."4
Although most police officers would deny relying on race as a
reason to initiate traffic stops, 5 the practice of stopping motorists for a
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1. See Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al.
2. See id.
3. See generally; David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Stopped and
Frisked Means Black and Poor, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the
Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
4. Fletcher, supra note 1, at Al.
5. But see testimony of defense witness Kathless Bell in trial of O.J. Simpson who stated
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minor traffic infraction for the real purpose of searching or investigating
them for other offenses is a common practice that the United States
Supreme Court recently upheld.6 In Whren v. United States,7 the
petitioners claimed that these "pretextual stops"8 violate the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution and are racially discriminatory. The
Supreme Court rejected the claim, upholding the constitutionality of
pretextual stops based on probable cause and noting that claims of racial
discrimination must be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.'
The Court effectively sidestepped the subtextual issue of race in
pretextual traffic stops,1" despite the mounting evidence that such stops
that former Los Angeles police officer Mark Fuhrman told her "of his hatred for interracial
couples and suggested he would often stop them for no reason-just to harass them." Simpon's
Lawyers Shift Gears, CHi. TRw., Sept. 2, 1995, at 3.
6. If a police officer has probable cause to believe that the motorist has committed a traffic
violation, he may forcibly detain him in order to issue a citation or even arrest him. See United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973). If the police officer decides to place the
motorist under arrest, he then has the legal authority to conduct a full-blown search incident to the
arrest of the motorist and the area around him. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63
(1969). Any evidence or contraband found on the motorist may be used as the basis for probable
cause to arrest him for other crimes. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996);
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 266. Aside from the opportunity to ticket or arrest a motorist, the
pretextual traffic stop gives a police officer the opportunity to request permission to search his car.
The police officer may legally request such permission to search, whether or not he decides to
issue a traffic ticket. Although the officer must have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
stop or arrest a motorist, once the reason for the stop or arrest is completed, the officer has the
right to continue to speak with him. Even if a police officer does not have probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed, he nonetheless
has the right to approach an individual and speak with him. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
434 (1991). The Supreme Court has held that if the individual does not want to talk to the officer,
he has the right to decline and walk away, and the exercise of those rights may not be used as the
sole basis for probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497-98 (1983)(citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556 (1980)). Although many
people do not realize they may refuse an officer's request to speak with them or search their car,
see Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating "people generally do not
know and usually do not care whether they have a lawful right to walk away without regard for
the presence of the policeman"); cf. Richard Cordray, Drivers Must Yield a Few Rights to Police
in War Against Crime, Court Decides, COLUMBus DISPATCH, July 1, 1996, at 7A (arguing that a
motorist may permit a search due to fear that refusal would cause harsher sanctions for an alleged
violation), the Supreme Court has held that police are not constitutionally required to inform
individuals of this right. See Ohio v. Robinette, 65 U.S.L.W. 4013 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1996) (No. 95-
891).
7. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
8. Although pretextual stops may be defined as any stop in which a police officer pretends to
stop an individual for one reason so that he may investigate them for another, this Essay will only
address pretextual stops in the traffic context.
9. See 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
10. See id. at 1774. The Court only briefly mentions the race issue in its reference to the
Equal Protection Clause as the proper constitutional basis for challenging selective enforcement of
the law based on race.
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are often racially motivated."1
The Whren Court left African-Americans and Latinos without an
effective remedy for discriminatory pretextual traffic stops when it
suggested the Equal Protection Clause as the appropriate constitutional
basis for challenging these stops. The motorist who is arrested after a
pretextual stop, as well as the motorist who is eventually allowed to go
his way, must overcome substantial hurdles to mount a successful
challenge to discriminatory police practices under the equal protection
clause. These problems may prove insurmountable for the arrested
motorist and may ultimately discourage other aggrieved motorists. In
this Essay, I will discuss the Supreme Court's failure to provide a clear
and effective remedy for discriminatory pretextual traffic stops. In Part
I, I discuss the discretionary nature of pretextual stops and their
discriminatory effect on African-Americans and Latinos. In Part II, I
examine the Whren decision and the ineffectiveness of the Court's
proposed remedy for both criminal defendants and motorists who are not
arrested. In conclusion, I stress the need for creative legal and policy-
based solutions.
I. THE DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOPS
Police officers exercise a tremendous amount of discretion in the
exercise of their official law enforcement duties. 2 The decisions to
stop,1 3 detain or arrest 14 an individual are all left to the discretion of
police officers. 15 No scenario better exemplifies both the benefits and
drawbacks of this discretionary arrest power than the traffic stop.
Because most jurisdictions enact hundreds of traffic regulations,' 6 it
11. See Brief for Petitioners at 21-29, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841).
12. See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
13. Police officers may stop and frisk suspects without probable cause if they have reasonable
and articulable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and dangerous." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The Court has
defined reasonable suspicion as "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21.
14. Police officers may arrest a suspect without a warrant for a felony or misdemeanor
committed in his presence or for a felony not committed in his presence if there are reasonable
grounds for making the arrest. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (citations
omitted). Probable cause is defined as "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
15. The police conduct investigations of criminal activities and make arrests. Practically
speaking, a decision not to stop, detain, or arrest is unreviewable. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO &
DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 681 (5th ed. 1996).
16. Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth
Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMp. L. REv.
221, 223 (1989)(stating "[t]he innumerable rules and regulations governing vehicular travel make
it difficult not to violate one of them at one time or another.").
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would be impossible for a police officer to issue a citation or make an
arrest for every traffic violation he observed, 7 nor would motorists
desire such a result. It is doubtful that motorists would support legisla-
tion requiring mandatory citations or arrests for all traffic violations.
Even if motorists wanted such legislation, the administrative costs of
implementing a system of mandatory citations or arrests for all traffic
offenses would be staggering. These practical considerations justify the
exercise of discretion, and police officers are arguably best situated to
make the necessary judgements based on factors such as the seriousness
of the offense and the actual or potential harm in a particular case. The
obvious drawback of police discretion is that it inherently involves treat-
ing similarly-situated motorists differently. A police officer may stop
and ticket only one driver, even when he observes several motorists
exceed the speed limit. This accepted exercise of police discretion may
seem unfair to some motorists, but it is both unavoidable and legal. The
more serious disadvantage of discretionary police power lies in its
potential for abuse. Pretextual traffic stops exemplify this abuse when
race-either consciously or unconsciouslyI 8-infuses the decision to
stop a motorist.
The legal standard governing a police officer's decision to stop a
suspect has become so flexible and loosely-defined, that it is difficult to
know whether, and to what extent, race influences the decision. In Terry
v. Ohio,19 the Supreme Court adopted reasonable suspicion as the stan-
dard governing a police officer's decision to stop and possibly frisk a
suspect.2" The Terry Court held that the officer must have "specific and
17. Driving over the speed limit, crossing the divider line, and changing lanes without
signalling are all examples of traffic violations that are committed with such frequency that their
volume prohibits the enforcement of the law in every case. It is probably fair to say that every
single driver in America has committed a traffic violation at some point in their lives, and most
probably commit them on a daily basis.
18. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). Professor Lawrence defines unconscious
racism as the ideas, attitudes, and beliefs developed in American historical and cultural heritage
that cause Americans unconsciously to attach significance to an individual's race and that induce
negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. See id. at 322. He argues that although
America's historical experience has made racism an integral part of our culture, because racism is
rejected as immoral, most people exclude it from their conscious minds. See id. at 322-23; see
also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016
(1988) (discussing unconscious racism in criminal law and procedure).
19. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
20. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court first held that a police officer may
stop and search an individual on less than probable cause. The Court established that the
decisions to stop and frisk a suspect are two distinct determinations. A police officer may stop an
individual if he has reasonable suspicion to believe that crime is afoot, but he may frisk the
suspect only if he has reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect is armed and dangerous. See id.
at 30.
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articulable facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from those
facts,' '1 t before stopping an individual. The Court held that mere suspi-
cion and inarticulable hunches would not suffice.22 However, in cases
decided after Terry, the Court has exhibited increasing deference to the
judgments of police officers in its interpretation of the reasonable suspi-
cion standard.23
In United States v. Cortez,24 the Court held that reasonable suspi-
cion should be based on the "totality of the circumstances" 25 and that
"[b]ased upon the whole picture the detaining officers must have a par-
ticularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped. '26  The Court held that the particularized suspicion must be
based on all the circumstances, including inferences and deductions by a
trained officer.27  Given this flexible standard that not only acknowl-
edges but credits the mental inferences of the police officer, it would be
difficult to discern whether, and to what extent, racial considerations
may be camouflaged in the midst of limitless inferences and deductions.
Police officers need not always conceal the fact that race has influ-
enced their decision to detain a suspect, because some courts have ruled
that race may be used as a detention factor in certain circumstances. 28
The Supreme Court has twice upheld the use of race in immigration
detention decisions. 9 Courts that have upheld the consideration of race
have held that race alone is not a sufficient basis for detention but may
21. Terry. 392 U.S. at 21.
22. 392 U.S. at 22.
23. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660-69 (1994) (suggesting that the Court has relaxed the
Terry standard in deference to law enforcement concerns).
24. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
25. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.
26. Id.
27. See 449 U.S. at 418.
28. See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394-96 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding race coupled
with other factors is a basis for reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying detention of young
black male in airport); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975) (deciding ethnic background
of defendant properly considered where person appears out of place in neighborhood); State v.
Ruiz, 504 P.2d 1307, 1307-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that police properly considered race
of defendant when they stopped a Mexican in an all-black area). But see State v. Barber, 823 P.2d
1068, 1074-75 (Wash. 1992) (holding that a person of a specific race being allegedly "out of
place" in a particular geographic area, can never constitute finding of reasonable suspicion of
criminal behavior); City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623, 628-29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that presence of white person from suburban town in mixed, high-crime neighborhood
does not constitute basis for detention).
29. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976) (holding that there
was no constitutional violation when border patrol detained motorists even if such referrals were
made largely on basis of apparent Mexican ancestry); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 885-87 (1975) (holding that border patrol officers may consider race of suspect as a factor in
decision to stop).
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be one of a number of factors in the detention calculus.3" Drug courier
profiles also permit the infusion of race in the detention decision."1 A
law enforcement agent compiles a lot of characteristics that have been
found through experience to be common characteristics of those
engaged in a certain type of criminal activity in order to form a criminal
profile. 32 Drug courier profiles have included a broad range of behav-
iors which often contradict.3 3 For example, some drug courier profiles
list individuals travelling alone by plane who exit last while others target
those who leave first.34 Travellers who carry certain types of luggage
appear on some profiles while individuals who travel without luggage
are on others.35 Most if not all of the conduct and characteristics listed
in the profile constitute innocent, noncriminal behavior. But in United
States v. Sokolow, 36 the Supreme Court held that the fact that individual
behaviors and characteristics were consistent with innocent behavior did
not exclude them from consideration in the overall determination of
whether the totality of the circumstances constituted reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause.37 Race or ethnicity are two of the "innocent"
characteristics specifically included in some drug courier profiles. 38
The use of drug courier profiles may be discriminatory even when
they do not list race as a characteristic because officers do not stop
whites who exhibit the other innocent behaviors or characteristics as fre-
30. See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391. 394-96 (8th Cir. 1992). For a detailed
discussion on race and detention, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
31. See United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1994) (Keith, J., dissenting)
(police officer involved in pretextual traffic stop testified that the defendants fit a drug courier
profile because they were "three young black male occupants in an old vehicle").
32. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 200
(5th ed. 1996).
33. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
examples of drug courier profiles which contradict each other).
34. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (explaining suspect last
to deplane), with United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982) (explaining suspect
first to deplane).
35. Compare United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977) (suspect without
luggage), with United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1980) (suspect with new
suitcases), and United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1981) (suspect carrying gym
bag).
36. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
37. 490 U.S. at 10 ("'[I]nnocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of
probable cause,' and "[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not
whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to
particular types of noncriminal acts.' That principle applies equally well to the reasonable
suspicion inquiry.") (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983)).
38. See United States v. Rosales, 60 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (Hispanic
men driving American-made luxury or performance automobiles); United States v. Weaver, 966
F.2d 391, 392-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (young black male, roughly dressed, walking rapidly towards
taxi stand, deplaned in Kansas City from L.A.).
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quently as African-Americans.39 A white man dressed in a business suit
who buys a round trip plane ticket with a quick turnaround time, travels
with no luggage, and deplanes last may not be detained. But a young
black man or woman casually dressed who acts and travels the same
way may raise the suspicions of law enforcement agents. If a police
officer who uses a profile treats similarly situated blacks and whites dif-
ferently, then race becomes the defining factor which elevates a suspi-
cion or hunch to reasonable suspicion or even probable cause.4"
Police who do not use drug courier profiles may believe that black
men and women are more likely to engage in certain types of criminal
behavior than whites because of statistical studies which purport to
prove disproportionate criminality among African-Americans.4 Police
officers who harbor these beliefs may either consciously or uncon-
sciously consider an African-American's race as a factor in the nebulous
reasonable suspicion calculus. The idea that one's race may be used in
the detention decision in any way other than as an identifying factor4 2
troubles some scholars and jurists. 43 But even if one accepts the argu-
ment that race may be used in some circumstances as one of many fac-
tors, it would be virtually impossible to determine precisely what role
race played in a particular detention decision. Did it play a minimal role
or was it in fact the officer's primary or even sole reason for stopping a
suspect?
Empirical evidence suggests that race is frequently the defining fac-
tor in pretextual traffic stops. Statistics gathered in connection with law-
suits filed by black motorists in New Jersey and Maryland reveal that 71
39. For a discussion of the use of race in drug courier profiles see Johnson, supra note 30, at
233-34.
40. See generally Johnson, supra note 30.
41. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
56-68 (1995)(analyzing studies which compare arrests and victim reports with incarceration rates
and concluding that blacks disproportionately commit certain types of crimes). But see Angela J.
Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1681
(1996) (criticizing Tonry's analysis and arguing that the use of arrest statistics as a measure of
criminal behavior is inherently flawed due to the discretionary and often discriminatory detention
and arrest decisions of police officers. Davis also argues that despite the problems inherent in
relying on arrest statistics, Tonry's analysis indicates the existence of substantial racial bias in the
criminal process).
42. Witnesses of crime may include the race of the suspect in their descriptions. See United
States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 83 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding stop of African-American driving
brown Cadillac within miles of bank proper where description of bank robbery suspects indicated
three black men escaped in brown Cadillac).
43. See United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 85 (8th Cir. 1976) (Heaney, J., dissenting)
(arguing factor of race eliminates persons of another race from suspicion, but police should not
suspect persons of identified race, especially in our society where "race is often an integral part of
police suspicion") (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: POLICE 184 (1967)); Johnson, supra note 30.
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percent of the 437 motorists stopped and searched along a northeastern
stretch of Interstate 95 in the first nine months of 1995 were black."
One hundred and forty-eight hours of videotaped traffic stops in Florida
revealed that seventy percent of the 1,048 motorists stopped along Inter-
state 95 were black or Hispanic, 45 even though Blacks and Hispanics
made up only five percent of the drivers on that stretch of the highway. 6
Less than one percent of the drivers received traffic citations and only
five percent of the stops resulted in an arrest.4 7
In 1993, an African-American man in the city of Reynoldsburg,
Ohio, sued the city after an informal group of police officers who called
themselves the "Special Nigger Arrest Team" targeted him for arrest. 48
Several officers confirmed the existence of the group and admitted that
its members singled out African-Americans for traffic stops and
arrests.4 9 The city eventually settled the lawsuit.50  Since police depart-
ments across the country have varying policies on the collection and
release of information about the race of motorists who are stopped,
detained, or searched, national statistics are not available.5 1
II. WHREN V. UNITED STA TES
The Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to remedy
discriminatory pretextual traffic stops in the case of Whren v. United
States. Despite the evidence that police officers used these stops to dis-
criminate against people of color, 2 the Court dismissed the issue in a
44. See Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al.
45. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at Al.
46. See Henry Pierson Curtis, Statistics Show Pattern of Discrimination, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Aug. 23, 1992, at All.
47. See Brazil and Berry, supra note 45.
48. See Fletcher, supra note 44.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. In examining the extent to which police officers use pretextual stops in a racially
discriminatory way, one must examine the extent to which police officers fail to stop, search and/
or arrest whites who commit traffic violations. When police officers stop whites for traffic
violations, do they ask them for permission to search their cars as much as they ask similarly
situated African-Americans? Do they arrest whites for traffic violations with the same frequency
as African-Americans? For a discussion of the discriminatory nature of discretionary police stops,
see Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1660 (1996). Since police officers do not routinely keep records of the instances in which they
either decline to stop individuals or stop them without issuing a citation or making an arrest, it is
difficult to document whether police officers treat white motorists more favorably than blacks.
But see infra note 106 and accompanying text for discussion of how such practices were
documented and collected as evidence in lawsuit brought against Maryland state troopers.
52. See Brief for the Petitioners at 21-29, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
(No.95-5841).
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single sentence, noting that the Equal Protection Clause was the appro-
priate constitutional basis for a claim of racial discrimination. 3 This
cryptic reference to the Equal Protection Clause constituted the Court's
entire response to the petitioners' argument that pretextual stops dis-
criminate against blacks and Latinos.
The facts of the Whren case reveal that the traffic stop was pretex-
tual. Two young African-American men were sitting in a Nissan Path-
finder at a stop sign when they were first spotted by two plain-clothes
police officers. The officers asserted that they were suspicious because
the occupants were youthful, the driver appeared to be looking into the
lap of the passenger, and the car had temporary license plates. 54 In addi-
tion, the young men were driving in a "high drug area" of Washington,
D.C. and the car remained at the stop sign for about twenty seconds,
which the officers considered to be an unusually long period of time.5
According to the officers, as the officers made a U-turn and drove
towards the Pathfinder, its driver made a sharp right turn without signal-
ling and sped off at a high rate of speed.56 The police officers followed
the Pathfinder until it stopped at a traffic light. 7 One of the officers got
out of the unmarked car and approached the driver's side of the win-
dow.5 The passenger was holding plastic bags containing what
appeared to be crack cocaine. 59 The officers placed the two young men
under arrest and charged them with various narcotics offenses.
60
The defendants moved to suppress the drugs, alleging that the stop
was illegal because the officers had neither probable cause nor reason-
able suspicion to believe the defendants had drugs. 6' The defendants
further claimed that the traffic stop was pretextual. The trial court
denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
"regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the
occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal
behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in
the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected
53. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
54. See id. at 1772.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. The petitioners concede that the officers had probable cause to believe that they had
violated various traffic regulations (failing to give full time and attention to the operation of their
vehicle, turning without signalling, and speeding). See Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 at 1772-73.
19971
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traffic violation."62 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.63
Although the Court had not previously ruled on the constitutional-
ity of pretextual traffic stops, it had addressed pretextual behavior in
previous cases and seemed to express a general disapproval of the prac-
tice.64 The Court acknowledged its discussion of pretextual stops and
searches in previous cases65 but noted, "not only have we never held,
outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection...
that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under
the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the
contrary. 66
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, finding the stop
legal because the police officers had probable cause to believe that the
driver had committed several traffic violations.67 The Court declined to
question the motivations of the police officers and rejected the notion
that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depended on the
actual motivations of the individual officers involved.68 The Court
noted that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind
which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justifica-
tion for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. '"69
The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the standard for
traffic stops should be "whether a police officer, acting reasonably,
would have made the stop for the reason given."7 The petitioners urged
this standard because they claimed that a police officer could easily use
62. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
690 (1996).
63. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 690 (1996).
64. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (stating use of inventory search as front for
general search for incriminating evidence improper); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17
n.27 (1987) (noting proper administrative inspection valid and not illegal); Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (approving inventory search where there was no showing police acted in
bad faith or for sole purpose of investigation); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per
curium) (noting officer's issuance of traffic citation not pretext for confirming unrelated
suspicions). But see United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983) (holding
customs officials with valid legal justification may board vessel regardless of alleged ulterior
motive); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (deciding subjective intent of agents'
wiretapping not relevant to legality of conduct); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-66
(1973) (following Robinson, Court upheld full search of person incident to arrest regardless of
officers' subjective fear that suspect might be armed); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
221 n.l, 236 (1973) (rejecting petitioner's argument that search was invalid because traffic
violation based arrest was pretext for drug search).
65. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773-74.
66. Id. at 1774.
67. See id. at 1777.
68. See id. at 1774.
69. Id. at 1774 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
70. Id. at 1773.
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a traffic stop as a pretext for investigating a motorist for some other
crime for which he had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspi-
cion .7  The petitioners further claimed that police officers might use
these traffic stops to detain motorists based on impermissible factors
such as race.72 The Court noted that the constitutional basis for chal-
lenging racially discriminatory enforcement of the law is the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 73  According to the Court,
any legal challenge which requires questioning the subjective motiva-
tions of a police officer is not suitable for Fourth Amendment analysis.
74
A. The Arrested Motorist
The Whren Court did not provide a clear, meaningful remedy for
the criminal defendant who is arrested based on drugs or other contra-
band found during a race-based pretextual traffic stop. Although crimi-
nal defendants alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights
traditionally seek suppression of the illegally seized evidence under the
exclusionary rule,75 the Whren Court identified the Equal Protection
Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment as the appropriate constitu-
tional basis for claims based on race discrimination. However, the Court
did not address the appropriate forum for raising such claims nor the
appropriate remedy if the defendant prevails.
A criminal defendant could file a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 198376 alleging that the police officer had denied him equal protection
71. See id. at 1772-74.
72. See id. at 1772-73.
73. See id. at 1774.
74. See id. Although the Court eschews questioning the motivations of police officers under
the Fourth Amendment, it requires proof of such motivations in Equal Protection analysis. See
generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (defendant alleging discrimination in the administration of Georgia's death penalty statute
in violation of the equal protection clause must prove that decision makers in his case acted with
discriminatory purpose).
75. Courts exclude evidence from the Government's case-in-chief on the merits of guilt or
innocence where the court determines that the evidence was the product of an unconstitutional
search or seizure. The Court first introduced the doctrine in federal courts in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and subsequently applied the rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). The Court has explicitly stated that the "exclusionary rule was a judicially
created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment." Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 482-93 (1976) (emphasis added).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdication thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
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of the laws. If he prevailed, he would be entitled to damages or injunc-
tive relief.7 7 But would these remedies really compensate an incarcer-
ated criminal defendant? Given the social hostility to citizens convicted
of criminal offenses, would an individual found guilty of a criminal
offense have any meaningful chance of securing a settlement or recoup-
ing monetary damages from a jury?78 What type of injunctive relief
would a court order? A judgment requiring police officers to refrain
from searching a defendant or his car without probable cause to believe
that criminal activity other than the traffic violation has occurred would
not compensate the defendant who has already suffered harmed.
Criminal defendants typically raise equal protection claims in their
criminal cases based on alleged racially discriminatory behavior by
prosecutors. In United States v. Annstrong,7 9 the defendants alleged
race-based selective prosecution and sought dismissal of the indictment
as the approprate remedy.80 In Batson v. Kentucky,8 the defendant
alleged discriminatory use of peremptory strikes during jury selection,
and at the trial stage, sought dismissal of the selected jury.82 Although
criminal defendants traditionally have not sought exclusion of evidence
as a remedy for an equal protection violation,83 exclusion would seem
the most appropriate remedy for unconstitutional police behavior since it
precisely meets the force of the violation. Likewise, criminal defendants
typically have not sought dismissal of the indictment as a remedy for
unconstitutional police behavior. However, since defendants would
allege race-based selective enforcement of the law as the constitutional
error, the violation is closely analogous to selective prosecution, and dis-
missal of the indictment might be the more appropriate remedy. The
Whren Court provides no guidance on these issues.
Whether the criminal defendant raises the equal protection claim in
the criminal or civil context, traditional Equal Protection analysis
requires that the defendant prove that a police officer intentionally dis-
criminated against him based on his race.84 Specifically, the defendant
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
78. Criminal defendants experience difficulty securing legal representation for these claims.
See infra note 108.
79. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
80. See id. at 1483; see also infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
81. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
82. Id. at 83.
83. But see State v. Pedro Soto, Superior Court of New Jersey (unpublished opinion, March 4,
1996) (suppressing evidence seized as result of discriminatory enforcement of the traffic laws by
the New Jersey State Police under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment and citing State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)).
84. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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must show that the law enforcement policy had a discriminatory effect 5
and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.8 6 A number of
scholars have criticized the traditional equal protection standard as being
an inadequate remedy for race discrimination because of the difficulty of
proving invidious intent on the part of the state actor.8 7 Motorists chal-
lenging pretextual stops would certainly face this obstacle. It would be
quite difficult for a black motorist to prove that a police officer stopped
or detained him because of his race. Even if the officer relied on a drug
courier profile which included race as a factor, short of an admission by
the police officer or similarly incriminating physical evidence, a motor-
ist could not prove that race served as the only reason or the primary
reason for the stop. 88
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Arm-
strong89 illustrates the obstacles a criminal defendant must overcome
when he alleges a denial of equal protection. In Armstrong, the Court
established the standard for discovery in criminal cases in which the
defendant alleges race-based selective prosecution.9" The Court held
that in order to obtain discovery, the defendant would have to present
some evidence that similarly situated defendants of another race could
have been prosecuted, but were not. 9' The standard for prevailing on the
merits is almost identical. The Court reaffirmed that a defendant
attempting to prove selective prosecution based on race in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause must prove that similarly situated defend-
ants of another race could have been prosecuted, but were not.92 Pre-
sumably, more proof would be required to prevail on the merits than to
obtain discovery, but the Armstrong Court does not provide much gui-
dance on this issue.
An African-American motorist alleging that a police officer's use
85. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of an equal protection violation by showing
that the application of the statute or regulation at issue has had a discriminatory effect. See id. at
241.
86. See id. at 239.
87. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 319-23 (1987) (arguing that most behavior that
produces racial discrimination results from "unconscious racial motivation"); Paul Brest, In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1976) (setting forth a
disproportionate impact doctrine as an alternative to the Washington v. Davis discriminatory
purpose standard, arguing that the Davis standard ignores the fact that "race-dependent decisions
are so often concealed").
88. See supra notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
89. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
90. Id. at 1487.
91. See id. at 1488-89.
92. See id. at 1487. The Court does not explain the difference between the discovery standard
and the standard for prevailing on the merits. Presumably more proof would be necessary to
prevail on the merits.
19971
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of a pretextual traffic stop constituted a denial of equal protection would
need to show that similarly situated white motorists could have been
stopped, detained or arrested, but were not. Armstrong suggests that
they would need to provide some evidence of such failures to stop to
obtain discovery and presumably more of such evidence to prevail on
the merits. How could a motorist obtain such evidence? Even if he did
not have to cross the Armstrong hurdle to get discovery, such informa-
tion would not be readily available. 93 Police officers do not keep
records of instances in which they could have stopped a motorist for a
traffic violation, but did not.
B. The Motorist Who is Not Arrested
Pretextual traffic stops may have a discriminatory effect on an indi-
vidual whether or not the police discover evidence of criminal activity.
When the police detain and search a motorist, they intrude on his pri-
vacy and possessory rights, his right to be left alone. While one might
be tempted to conclude that when the police detain an individual and
ultimately release him, he suffers little or no harm, when the detention is
based on race, the harm is felt long past the duration of the stop.
One would surmise that the motorist who is not arrested and there-
fore does not carry the stigma or bear the practical difficulties of an
incarcerated criminal defendant should be able to challenge a racially
discriminatory pretextual traffic stop successfully. The case of Robert
Wilkins v. Maryland State Troopers, illustrates that the Whren Court's
proposed remedy for these stops may fail even in the best case
scenario. 94
Mr. Wilkins does not come close to fitting a drug courier profile.
With the exception of his African heritage, he displays none of the char-
acteristics or behavior listed in the typical drug courier profile. Mr. Wil-
kins is 33 years old, married, and drives a 1989 Nissan Sentra. He wears
horn-rimmed glasses and dresses conservatively. A graduate of the
Harvard Law School and a staff attorney at the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia, Mr. Wilkins is an active member of the
Union Temple Baptist church where he serves as a trustee and mentor in
the Rites of Passage Manhood program, a mentoring program for young
men eleven to seventeen years old. Despite his quiet and modest man-
93. See infra note 106 for discussion of how such information was compiled in a pending
lawsuit.
94. Although Mr. Wilkins' case was brought and resolved one year before the Whren
decision, his claim alleged a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as violations of the Fourth
Amendment, Maryland common law, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1983 (1994).
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ner, Mr. Wilkins' physical appearance is almost regal, primarily because
of his carriage-proud, upright, and most dignified. His speech is pre-
cise, clear, always proper and never profane. Its content reveals his
intelligence and thoughtfulness.
On May 8, 1992, Mr. Wilkins was driving from Chicago to Wash-
ington, D.C. with his aunt, uncle and cousin. They had attended the
funeral of Mr. Wilkins' grandfather, Rev. G.R. Wilkins, Sr. The family
was driving a Cadillac they had rented for the trip. They had decided to
drive all night so that Mr. Wilkins could arrive on time for a client's
9:30 a.m. court appearance.
At about 5:55 a.m., Maryland state police officer V.W. Hughes
stopped the car on 1-68 in Cumberland, Maryland. Mr. Wilkins' cousin,
Scott El-Amin, was driving at the time. Officer Hughes stated that Mr.
E1-Amin had been driving sixty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour
zone. Before issuing either a ticket or a warning, Hughes produced a
form requesting consent to search the car. The family declined consent
and refused to sign the form. Hughes stated that the searches were rou-
tine and further stated "if you have nothing to hide, then what is the
problem?" Mr. Wilkins' uncle stated that he would not consent to the
officer searching through all of their belongings on the highway in the
rain. Mr. Wilkins asked Hughes why he wanted to search the car.
Hughes refused to provide an explanation and merely repeated his
request. He then mumbled something about "problems with rental cars
coming up and down the highway with drugs." Mr. Wilkins then
informed Hughes that they were returning from his grandfather's funeral
in Chicago and offered to show him a copy of the obituary. Hughes
declined the offer and informed the family that if they did not consent to
the search, they would have to wait while he called for a narcotics dog to
come and sniff the car.
Mr. Wilkins, drawing on his experience as a criminal defense
appellate and trial lawyer, informed Hughes that there was a Supreme
Court case entitled United States v. Sharpe9 5 that prevented him from
detaining them without a reasonable, articulable suspicion that they were
carrying drugs.96 Mr. Wilkins further noted that the officer had no such
reasonable suspicion. No doubt irritated rather than enlightened by Mr.
Wilkins' impromptu lesson in criminal procedure, the officer told Mr.
Wilkins and his family that they would just have to wait.
At approximately 6:25, Sergeant Brown arrived with a narcotics
dog and ordered them out of the car. The family asked if they could
remain in the car during the dog sniff so they could stay out of the rain
95. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
96. See id. at 683; id. at 689 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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and away from the dog. The police officers refused their request and
insisted that they stand in the rain. The german shepherd sniffed slowly
and thoroughly around the car while curious motorists passed on the
highway. The dog detected nothing. Hughes issued a $105 speeding
ticket and at about 6:35, the Wilkins family continued on their way. Mr.
Wilkins was late for his court appearance.
Mr. Wilkins and his family felt humiliated and angry. Unlike most
motorists who endure this experience, Mr. Wilkins decided to pursue
legal action. He wrote to the local office of the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"). After meeting with Mr. Wilkins, the ACLU lawyers
decided to represent him. Lawyers from the firm of Hogan and Hartson
agreed to join as counsel. They filed a lawsuit against the Maryland
State Police, alleging that Mr. Wilkins and his family had been falsely
imprisoned and intentionally treated differently on account of their race
in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, Maryland common law, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and 42 U.S. C. Sec. 1983.97 In addition to violations of
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the plaintiffs claimed deprivation of "their right to equal pro-
tection of the laws as enjoyed by similarly situated Caucasian citizens of
the United States secured to them by the Fourteenth Amendment." '98
On June 5, 1995, the Maryland State Police agreed to a settlement
involving monetary damages and injunctive relief.99 The Maryland
State Police consented to adopt a policy prohibiting the use of race-
based drug courier profiles as a law enforcement tool. 00 They further
agreed that the policy would direct all Maryland State Police not to use a
race-based profile as a cause for stopping, detaining, or searching motor-
ists traveling on Maryland roadways. 0 1 The policy would be enforced
through appropriate investigation and disciplinary action. 10 2 Additional
terms of the agreement included the implementation of a mandatory
training program incorporating the policy and a requirement that com-
puter records of all stops involving consent to search or dog sniffs be
maintained.' 03 Such records would document the date, time, and loca-
tion of the consent, search, or dog sniff, the name of the officer, the race
97. See Robert L. Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, Complaint filed in U.S District Court for
the District of Maryland, p. 3.
98. Id. at p. 12.
99. See Settlement Agreement, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Civil
Action No. MJG-93-468.
100. See id. at p. 3.
101. See id.
102. See id. at p. 4.
103. See id.
[Vol. 51:425
RACE, COPS, AND TRAFFIC STOPS
of the person(s) stopped, detained or searched, the year, make, and
model of the car and the grounds for requesting the search or dog
sniff.104
The agreement also provided that after July 1, 1995, if the plaintiffs
made a reasonable showing that a pattern and practice of race-based
stops existed, plaintiffs might seek to require the defendants to provide
additional identifying information in the computer records and the
Court's jurisdiction would be extended to June 30, 1998.105 The infor-
mation received thus far indicates a continued pattern and practice of
stopping African-Americans.10 6  The plaintiffs have filed pleadings
requesting that the defendants be held in contempt of court.10 7
In one sense, Robert Wilkins' story is a hopeful one. Despite con-
tinuing litigation, the outcome of his case was successful. He secured a
settlement agreement which compels the Maryland State Police to
refrain from considering race as a factor in the decision to stop, detain,
and search motorists on Maryland highways. His family received mone-
tary compensation for the harm they experienced.
On the other hand, Mr. Wilkins' case engenders pessimism about
the interaction of police forces with African-American citizens on streets
and highways. Despite the settlement agreement, preliminary findings
indicate a continued pattern of discriminatory stops and searches by the
Maryland state police. As a result, Mr. Wilkins' lawyers continue to
seek judicial relief. Moreover, the ramifications of this case for most
other African-American motorists are, at best, uncertain. Unfortunately,
Mr. Wilkins' case cannot be used as an example of what every similarly
aggrieved African-American can achieve. First, Mr. Wilkins is far more
educated than most motorists-black or white-particularly in the area
of Fourth Amendment law, and was able confidently to assert his rights.
Second, he was not arrested and charged with a criminal offense, and
thus had access to more legal options. Third, Mr. Wilkins' persona-
104. See id. at p. 5.
105. See id.
106. In preparation for further litigation, the plaintiffs and their lawyers commissioned testers
to compile additional evidence. These testers drove on a stretch of 1-95 between Baltimore and
Delaware at exactly 55 mph (the speed limit for this portion of the highway) and documented the
number of drivers who drove over the speed limit and committed other obvious traffic violations.
Preliminary test results indicate that 17% of drivers on this part of the highway were black and
that 17% of black drivers committed traffic violations. Ninety-three percent of all drivers
committed some traffic violation. Thus, African-Americans were not found to violate traffic
regulations more than members of other racial groups. In fact, the statistics indicate the opposite
conclusion. Interview with Robert Wilkins, October 27, 1996.
107. See Paul W. Valentine, Maryland State Police Still Target Black Motorists, ACLU Says,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 1996, at Al. Seventy-three percent of the cars stopped and searched by
troopers on 1-95 between Baltimore and Delaware since January 1995 were driven by African-
Americans. The police found nothing in seventy percent of the drug searches. See id.
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intelligent, articulate, well-educated, church-going and charismatic-
had much to do with the ACLU's decision to handle his case.10 8  No
doubt, these factors also influenced the decision of the Maryland State
Police to settle the case."0 9 Finally, his case has no legal precedential
value for other aggrieved motorists.
IV. CONCLUSION
The race-based pretextual traffic stop tears a hole in the fabric of
our constitution by allowing discriminatory behavior to invade the crim-
inal justice system. Faced with the opportunity to repair the hole, the
Supreme Court chose to ignore it, leaving African-Americans and other
people of color without a clear and effective remedy for this discrimina-
tory treatment. In a certain sense, discriminatory police stops are the
first in a chain of racially lopsided decisions by officials in the criminal
justice process."i 0 With the exception of its decision in Batson v. Ken-
tucky,"' the Supreme Court has consistently dodged the resolution of
these issues," 2 leaving people of color without relief.
When people of color experience injustices that are tolerated and
even sanctioned by courts and other criminal justice officials, they
develop distrust and disrespect for the justice system. That lack of faith
translates into hopelessness, frustration, and even violence. The 1992
Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of the police officers charged
with the beating of Rodney King"I3 and the 1996 riots in St. Petersburg
occasioned by the shooting of a black motorist by a police officer" 4
offer examples of what may happen when that frustration is ignored.
108. The motorist who decides to seek legal assistance must find a lawyer or organization to
accept his case. Most lawyers, aware of the difficult legal standards, will only take the case if the
facts and circumstances suggest a winning case. The ACLU gets hundreds of telephone calls and
letters from African-Americans alleging illegal and/or unconstitutional behavior by police
officers. They decline the vast majority of the cases for a variety of reasons, including the
unavailability of resources. One factor they consider is whether the potential plaintiff will appeal
to a jury if a lawsuit is brought. Individuals with criminal records are not considered attractive
plaintiffs. Telephone Interview with Debbie Jeon, attorney for the Maryland Eastern Shore branch
of the ACLU (Nov. 8, 1996).
109. Because the case was settled, one can only speculate as to the difficulties Mr. Wilkins and
his family may have faced in establishing invidious intent on the part of the police officer as
required by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.229, 239 (1976). See supra notes 84-87 and
accompanying text.
110. See generally Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System,
94 MicH. L. REv. 1660 (1996).
111. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
112. See e.g., Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996); United States v. Armstrong, 116
S. Ct. 1480 (1996); McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
113. See Stephen J. Sansweet, LAPD Officers are Acquitted in King Beating, Mayor Declares
Emergency Amid Rise in Violence; National Guard is Called, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1992, at A14.
114. See St. Petersburg's Message, CHR. Sci. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1996, at 20 (discussing
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"Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially
pernicious in the administration of justice." '15 "Disparate enforcement
of criminal sanctions 'destroys the appearance of justice and thereby
casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.""' 16 Nondiscrimina-
tory law enforcement policies and effective legal remedies accessible to
all aggrieved citizens must be developed to restore the integrity of the
legal process and the trust of all citizens.
reasons underlying riot and comparing to riots after acquittal of officers in Rodney King beating in
1992).
115. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
116. Id.
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